[Fr.B1] 

1)     With the study of the predicaments, called also ‘categories’, we study the particular modes of being which are really distinct from each other and do not necessarily follow on being simply bec. it is being. Some of these modes were regarded by Ar. as self-evident. Inductively he found that they amounted to 10. There is substance (being which exists in itself) and 9 accidents (being which can only exist in another) which are : quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, place, position, time and possession.

2)   The predicaments are analogical modes of being, and for Ar. the typical example of analogy of attribution, although it is also an analogy of proportionality (St. Thomas ).

3)   Only in material substances can there be found the 10 predicaments, since quantity and the accidents related to it cannot exist in spiritual substances. It also applies strictly speaking only to creatures and not to God who is above it. That is why it is improper to define God as a substance.

 

 

 

 By Fr. Raymond Taouk,

I. existence

 

1)   Infra philosophical evidence :

 

A) common language : we distinguish the subject and verb from the predicate and direct/ind. object. If the subject is a noun (pronoun), it is a thing with certain properties, hence the concept of substance.

B) (natura, fu,sij): the new operations of the same being: the same being grows, has new activities which it did not have at first, has many different activities and properties, which exist thanks to this subsisting whole. Without this permanent foundation, the diverse activities would not remain harmoniously ordered to the whole.

C) Our personal experience reveals to us that we are conscious that, behind our acts, there is a ‘I’ (foundation of our reality and our unity) and behind those of others there is a ‘you’, and a ‘it’, which we extend to all things in so far as they are separate beings.

 

2)   A deeper metaphysical study shows the ex. of subst.[1] :

A) as underlayer in change. there are obviously beings in the world. But these beings subsist either by themselves (substances) or by others (out of which they receive their existence as accidents). But all things cannot belong to the 2d category. If that was the case, we could not explain how a thing remains the same while certain of its attributes change (accidental change), or why we never have energy in se, or colour in se, but always the energy of a thing... Substance is the substratum of things changing.

B) a subsistence : bec. substance is principle of unity of a being. Ar. states that “Being has several meanings. On the one hand, it means essence and the determined individual; on the other hand, it signifies that a thing has this quality or this quantity or... But though there are these many meanings of being, it is obvious that being, in the primary sense, is the essence, which indicates the substance of a thing... Thus, it is clearly by this category that each other category exists. Consequently, being in the fundamental sense, not this or that mode of it but being without qualification, must be substance.”[2] 

 

Ie. the multiplicity is unintelligible, unaccountable, unless it have some common bond of unity, ie. of being. That which is the principle of existence of the being per se must exist per se, and that is the subst. considered as subsistence ‘quod est vel subsistit’. Substance is the principle of unity and of intelligibility of the multiform data of reality.

 

3)   is Substance an imperceptible or a ficticious entity? 

 

A) Regarding perception : what is immediately given in perception is neither appearances (in the sense of the subjectivists) nor substance as such, but the concrete individual being of subst + accdts: ‘I see this black-thing’ = I see a black colour which reveals a substance. Only later on, by analysis, do we distinguish the substance from the accidts. Substance is not an immediate perception, but yes an immediate inference (wo it, there is no intelligibility).

B) Regarding the identification of what is substance and what is not: this is not so clearly known since subst. is not immediately perceived. Experience leads naturally to admit a plurality of substances, at least among the living things, and also among inorganic materials, although this is less clear.

C) Subst. is not only a necessity of language transposed into reality. Logic corresponds to reality, and especially judgments presuppose factual and not ficticious modes of objective being.

 

 

ii. nature of substance

 

 

            1) HISTORICAL SURVEY OF PHILOSOPHY RE. SUBSTANCE

 

 

1)   The Ancients:

 

A) In Plato, entity has the sense of :

- property, riches

- a thing real and existing

- the essence, the formal aspect of things

- the reality of the world of ideas

- the actual existence and the reality as it is expressed by the copula ‘is’.

- the 3 degrees of being (Ideas, intermediary realities like the soul, sensible things).

 

B) Aristotle

a) says that is the central problem of philosophy, to know the nature of being. Certain things are called beings because they are substances, others bec. they are determinations of substances, and others because they allow substances to be formed. Ousia designates the individual being, the most intimate source and concentration of reality.

b) Critique : despite the value of Ar. on subst., it is not wo limits. Substances exist in the cosmos by themselves wo metaphs. explanation and creation poses a problem. to,de ti,, this particular thing, is said also of the form.

 

2)   St. Thomas.

 

A) ST distinguishes betw. substance and essence, between the concrete thing (habens esse per se) and its essence (quod quid est ou selon Ar. quod quid erat esse) : the concrete thing has a form essentially specific but is not identical with it. Subst. signifies an essential  form  to which we attribute the esse per se. God is not a subject apt to receive accidents as the substance is.

B) Substance is quasi per se subsistens, distinct from all other beings, it is stg one and unique since it is not communicable to others. For ST, to be by itself (proper of the subst) is the secret of its incommunicability. He attributes a greater value than Ar. to the knowl. of individual things : to know the individual things is part of our perfection (I 14,11). If our first knowl. is abstract, it must however come back to the individuals which exist in reality.

 

3)   Decadent Scholastics

 

A) Duns Scotus considers the substance as a collection of forms rather than a being having a true unity. He considers that we do not have any concept of the substance which would express its essence (anti-intellectual trend) since our experience knows immediately only the accidents. By refusing the analogy of being, he refuses to see the substance as the being par excellence, and he prepares the way to nominalism.

B) Suarez says that subst = being by itself, support of accidents. But the accidents are beings by their own entity and bec. they have a proper act of being. Matter has also its own entity, and is united to the form. In this view, material substances do not have the intrinsic unity which ST. sees in them.

 

 

4)   Moderns:

 

A) Descartes : substance is a thing which needs only itself to exist. We have a clear idea of it. He identifies subst. with its attributes (soul= thought; body= extension). Thus disappears the distinction betw. subst. and accidents, and since subst. does not change, there is no substantial change nor finality. The infinite substance, God, is properly and integrally autonomous.

B) Spinoza takes some ideas from Descartes. Subst. is that which exists in itself and is conceived by itself, i.e. a thing the concept of which needs not be deduced from another[3]. This last part introduces the modi which add to the only substance (God) what the individual essence adds to the genus. The subst. is one, unique and universal. It is the cause of itself, outside of which no other substance can exist. The modi determine this subst. and make it thinkable, and render account of the apparent multiplicity of the universe. This theory changed the sense of the word substance meaning from then on (in German Idealism) being in general instead of this concrete being.

C) Locke says that the subst. exists (it carries the accidts) but is unknowable : there is an unknown substratum yet presupposed by qualities which we recognize and cannot imagine subsisting per se.

D) Hume goes further and denies also the existence of a substance, and accepts only “a collection and a succession in time of qualities perceptible to the senses”, it is but “a collection of simple ideas, united by the imagination, to which we have given a part. name”.

E) Kant is a debtor to Hume in his idealist critique of the concept of substance. This idea is a subjective a priori form of the h. intellect which precedes any experience.

F) In the post-kantian idealism, substance becomes either the ego which contains in itself the entire reality and can be everything (Fichte), or the Absolute, also subject of accidents (Hegel).

G) Modern philosophy has banished substance, as well as did the new physical and psychological modern theories. For Russell, subst. is rejected bec. it is an inert mass, useless behind the phenomena. Others see reality as a sum total of relations, produced by a fundamental activity (taken from the materialistic monism). In analytical philosophy (Bergson, Le Roy among others), the word ‘substance’ is the mere projection of the linguistic structures, the distinction betw. subst. and accdts being the transposition of the structure of a phrase (subject-predicate). Sartre sees much progress of modern thought in having done away with the distinction betw. a hidden center (the ‘illusion of the back-worlds’ of Nietzsche) and the appearance.

H) Only Leibniz and Heidegger maintained the existence of the substance. For Leibniz, it is the monad, a real substance, from which the physical bodies are produced, as the conglomerate of monads. Heidegger places the ‘ousia’ in the center of his philo. quest, yet he understands it not so much as the being itself, but as the fact of becoming present to being.

I) Modern physics rejects the concept of substance in as much it limits itself to the study of the phenomena (esp. the quantitative aspects of nature, expressed in mathematical formulae).

 

 

            2) definition

 

1)   In general :

A) it is that which subsists, whose act is to be : substance is in the line of existence, nature, no.

B) it is subject (in se) of accidents (in substantia).

 

2)   In particular :

A) Substance : Id cui competit esse in se et non in alio tanquam in subjecto inhaesionis

B) Essence (stricte sumpto, or quidditas) : id quo res est id quod est. It is what constitutes the esse in its proper species : the form for spiritual subst. (angel), form + common matter for material substances; e.g. humanity (soul and body in genere).

C) Nature : principium et causa motus et quietis eius in quo est per se et non per accidens  (nature is idem re ac essentia, but diverse ratione indicates the principle of activity, whereas essence indicates the metaphysical constituent, the quid est as opposed to the other mtphscl constituent, the esse).

 

 

 

            4) properties

 

1)   una

2)   separata

3)   non suscipit magis vel minus

4)   non habet contrarium (substances are either identical or disparate things, never contrary)

5)   non suscipit motum  (which supposes a subject of motion : there is no subject to the subject/substance)

6)   suscipit contraria (contraries can be received in the substance, yet not simultaneously).

 

 

iii. division of substance

 

 

            1) substance (Mphs, and logical)

 

	PRIMA	Completa : suppositum pfte	rationalis : Persona
Substantia	(nec in nec de)	subsistens in ratione speciei	irrationalis : hypostasis
(non in)	singularis & concreta (Socrates)	Incompleta: impfte subsistens in rat.sp: pars	-metphsc (corpus, anima) - integralis (manus, pes)
	SECUNDA (non in sed de) : abstracta, logica (Homo)

 

Distinction of substance and essence as to their first meaning :

 

Substantia  (ens)	Essentia (species)
Prima : concreta et singularis (Socrates, Verbum)	Prima : abstracta et univ. (Humanitas, Deitas)
Secunda : universalis (Homo, Deus)	Secunda : ‘concreta’ et singularis                  (haec humanitas, haec divinitas)

 

1.      What exists is the real substance.

2.      Essences are per se object of our mental concepts. Essence taken precisely (a the sole specific part of man) cannot be predicated of the concrete being : ‘Socrates is humanity’ is incorrect.

3.      The use of terms is of great importance in theology (cf. Ia 13 De nominibus Dei; I 39 re. the use of concrete/abstract terms in designating the persons or the essence in the H. Trinity).

 

 

            2) species of substance

 

1)        Composita : ex materia et forma (subdivided into the different ramifications of the tree of Porphyry  by logical specific differences into

-        non-living

-        living : nonsentient or sentient (either irrational or rational)

(the ancients distinguished the composite or material substance firstly into corruptible (sublunary bodies) and incorruptible (celestial bodies, immutable in substance except by accdtl change[4]).

2)        Simplex sive immaterialis (pura forma) I 50.

A) Multiplication is either material (or numerical within the same unique species -knife 1, 2 or 3-which supposes quantity, distinct parts of steel) or formal (distinction of species, like cat and dog).

B) These immaterial substances cannot be numerically multiplied (they lack quantity/matter ie. potency to be ‘part-ible’). Therefore, they are multiplied by their form : i.e. St. Michael has a totally distinct species or nature from St. Raphael (except the common gender of being both immaterial created substances).[5]

 

 

I. Nature

 

1)   history, etymology, nominal definition.      These are determinations which are not the thing itself, but are attributed to it, as we say in Latin accidere, whose word ‘accidens’ has the same structure as the Greek term sumbebhko,j( sun bai,nw (to come with). A colour cannot exist except as attribute of a subject. The accidents lead us to the substance which they modify. In their definition, the substance is mentioned as their subject of inherence. The accidents are not called beings as such, but ‘entis entia’, as quality and movement (Mphsc XII 2419).

 

2)   Real def: Accidens est id cui competit esse in alio tamquam in subjecto inhaesionis. Thus:

A) accidentium esse est inesse (they have no proper esse, but the esse of the substance).[6]

B) Accidens est potius entis quam ens. The accidents are accessory determinations of the substances (they actuate the substance per accidens, in so far as the subst. is still in potency, ie. accidentally, bec. essentially it is in act by its subst. form). The proper accidents neither are produced nor perish, except when the substance does so : they are educed from the potency of the substance. Not so w. the non proper accdts, which are produced by an extrinsic efficient cause.

 

3)   N.B.: Do not confuse

A) predicamental ‘accidens’ (studied in metaphysics, 9 in number, distinguished from the substance, ie. the real thing which affects the concrete substance, eg. a rational, risible, white man).

B) predicable ‘accidens’ (studied in logic, which designates a specific way of predicating P of S)

a) accidental predication is that where the P is purely accidental to the S like  white said of man.

b) risible said of man would be a proper of man.

c) rational is the specific difference of man.

 

II. existence

 

1)   Some philosophers have denied the existence of accidents (in part or totally). Can a substance be identical to its own actions?  SA said that “mens, notitia et amor sunt substantialiter in anima, vel ut idem dicam essentialiter, et dicit quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una vita, una mens, una essentia.”[7] Averroes said that the immaterial subst. have no actions which would be accidents. Gentile identified the int. which its thoughts.

 

2)   Diverse types of actions. Nulla substantia est per se operans. Its actions are also distinct betw. to make and to do (poiei/n( pra,ttein), the latter includes the acts of the cognitive and appetitive faculties. The philosophers of the M.Ages distinguish the immanent from the transitive actions according as the term of the action is within or without the subject/agent.

A) The immanent action “does not go outside but remains in the agent”, to the point that it takes place within the agent, for the perfection of the agent.[8]

B) The transitive actions ‘reach stg outside the agent’ and transform the object.

 

3)   Proof by the active and passive potencies :

A) Can a substance be identical to its actions?  The distinction, clear for the transitive action, is true also of the immanent actions which have a certain indetermination in their object (whereas the substance is clearly determined and limited). Only in God thought and love are the very divine being itself.

B) If the actions differ from their substance, the same is to be said of the principle of the actions, the faculties, which are of the same type of accident as the actions (qualities, see art. 3).

 

4)   Metaphysical proof [9]

M. We must always judge the potencies by the acts to which they are ordained since potentia dicitur ad actum (correlative act).

m1 But the essence is ordered to esse (its proper act), and the potency/faculty to its operation. The faculties will be identical to the essence/substance if and  only if their acts are identical.

m2. But,

- the essence is always in act of existing, whereas the faculties are not always operating (dormiens non philosophat).

- the potencies must be as varied as their acts and formal objects, whereas the essence is one.

C. The potencies must be really distinct from their essence. QED.

 

5)   Proof by the finality of the accidents.[10]     

A) The powers or faculties are not added to the essence in the same way as the form is united and added to the matter. The substance terminates in its own self, whereas the potencies put the substance in connection with the world outside. nulla substantia est per se operans. Omne agens agit propter formam.

B) This argument by finality is the greatest to prove the existence of potencies. Potencies distinct from the essence are necessary to bring this essence outside its nature. Created beings have such a nature that in order to pose themselves in existence, in order to know themselves, they have to have reciprocal relations with other created beings.

 

6)   The existence of accidents in immaterial forms.

O .forma simplex non potest esse subjectum.

Ans. even the separate form or soul has a part of potency, and in as much as it is potential, it is determinable or ‘actu-able’ by accidents (faculties/potencies). Thus, angels have accidents, some proper (int., will, relation of creation), others accidental (place, actio, passio).

 

iii. distinction between the accidents ‘proprium’ & ‘accidens’

 

1)     St. Bonaventure, following the Augustinian philosophical school, maintained that, although some potencies were distinct from the essence (potency of heating is a quality), nevertheless the power of generating and the 3 powers of the soul (memory, intellect and will) were substantial, ie. reducible to the substance and not accidental.

 

2)   ST: The problem of the study of the powers of the soul brings to light the fight between Augustinism and Thomism. The truth affirmed by St. Bonaventure is safeguarded by St. Thomas by the theory of the proper accdts. Instead of the concrete psychology of St. Augustine, ST poses the problem at the level of ontological psychology : he distinguishes the elements without making a true real separation. In concreto of course, all is in one subject :“Idem autem est quod potest operari et quod operatur, unde oportet quod eius sit potentia sicut subjecti cuius est operatio.”[11]

 

3)   Mode of  production : this distinction gives rise to the distinct production of these accidents

A) the properties or accidents ‘proper’ are produced (‘educti’) from the specific principles of the essence, and thus will be common to all individuals of the same species : eg. the form proper of the horse; risibility, intellect and will in man.

B) the non-proper accidents can again be divided into 2 regarding their production :

a) accidents inseparable from each individual : they come from the concrete way of production of the form in this matter (the numerical or individual distinction comes from the material principles : matter, qtty)  : eg. to be tall or small, black or blond hair, man or woman.

b) accidents separable from the subject : they come

i from the action of the subject (to be seated-situs; in the shade-locus; to study-actio; to withstand an attack-passio),

ii from an external agent (to get burned by fire, to receive some sickness, to learn from a teacher-actio on the part of the agent; passio in the term).

 

IV. RELATION OF CAUSALITY BETWEEN SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENTS (I 3, 6; 77 6)

 

1)   Unity :

A) The empiricists (and worst of all, Hume) denied the unity of the concrete being : substance is just a group (fascis) of many distinct phenomena, wo unity, wo producing one concrete being.

B) Substance and accidents, really distinct, are also really one. We speak of one man although he has many accidents added to his substance. That is bec the accidents are of the being, and are not a being as such. The unity of the concrete being is manifested by the unity of its operations (man understands by  his intelligence) : agere sequitur esse.

C) The foundation of this unity of the concrete being made of substance and accidents is produced by the single act of ‘esse’ which belongs properly to the substance ‘substantia subsistit vel est’.

 

2)   Relation between substance and accidents

 

A) doctrine :

a) material cause : the substance is the subject, substratum, of the accidents.

b) quasi formal cause : the accident determines and actuates the substance, which is in potency to receive the accidental determinations, which give it its ultimate perfection.

c) efficient cause : the substance is the efficient cause of the accidents ‘proper’(to species & indvdl).

d) final cause : the substance is the end of the accidents, accidens propter substantiam (as the body is for the soul, the less dignified for the more dignified).

 

B) Objection :

 

O/ What about the apparent contradiction : the substance is passive (potency) and active (efficient cause) with regards to accidents?

Resp/  They are co-relative principles (as form and matter have a certain co-aptatio, as A/P, soul/body), they mutually exercise an influence over each other but on a different line of causality (see above) and also on a different line of structure :

-        the substance is passive with regards to the accdts (they perfect the essence of the subst)

-        the substance  is active with regards to the being/esse (acdts participate in esse subst).

 

C) order of knowledge.

a) The accidents  are known per se by the senses (per accidens the substance).

b) confused concept of the whole : The first object which comes under the int. is being, ie. the substance. The accidents known by the senses appear as secondary manifestations of a subsisting subject (substance) not yet identified.

c) Clear concept of the substance : through the accidents we obtain an intelligible knowl of the nature or essence of the subject (what quacks and walks like a duck is a duck).

d) clear concept of the accidents : by knowing the substance, cause of the accidents, we can have a deeper knowl of the accidents.

 

 

v. diverse possibilities of entering & exiting existence (75,6)

 

 

		Sec.    INDEPENTIAM FORMAE   IN          ESSE			ita impossibilitas/possibilitas INEUNDI/EXEUNDI  esse.
F	DEI = DEUS	A SE (increati)	PER SE	NON subj	­­­­---------------------
O	Angeli=Angelus	AB	(subsistens	IN	Creatio et anihilatio A DEO
R	Animae=Anima			ALIO
M A	Compositio=/=compositum	ALIO	PER Aliud	(substantls)	Generatio et corruptio PER conjunctionem/separationem formae &mat
	Accidts=/= subjectum	(creata)	non subsst	in Alio(accdtl)	Alteratio, augmentatio...IN subjecto

 

·        ab alio :             Creatura causatur a Deo (efficient cause)

·        per aliud:           forma subsistit per compositum (formal cause)

·        in alio :              accidens inest subjecto (material cause)

 

 

 

VI. division

 

1)   N.B. : by looking at the table of accidents below, we find that 2 of them (possession-habitus[12], position-situs[13]) are of little importance; The totality of the predicaments belong to material substances only, many belong to physics: qtty, possession, place, time, position, action and passion. Which leaves only quality and relation to speak of in Mphcs.

 

2)   division of the accidents :

 

affectans	absolute	consequens materiam			quantitas
substantiam		consequens formam			qualitas
intrinsece	relative				ad aliquid
affectans			tempus		quando
substantiam		ut mensurans	locus	sine ord. partium	ubi-locus
extrinsece	omnino extra			cum ord. partium	situs
ab eo quod		non ut mensurans			habitus
est	sec quid	ut principium			actio
	extra	ut terminum			passio

 

 

 

VII. order

 

 

1)   Subject : one accident can be the subject of other accidts, eg. colour inheres the subst. by the accident of quantity (in corporeal subst., quantity is the first accdt).

2)   in potency : one accident can be in potency to another, and can make the substance capable of that other accident (the accdt facultas intellectus or habitus sapientiae enables the soul to perform int. acts).

3)   cause : one accident may be the cause of another (an accident is cause of a relation : active generation is cause of the mutual relation paternity/filiation).

 

 

 

 

I. history

 

1)   Leucippius and Democritus deny the ex. of qlty, mechanicists accepting only matter and denying all sensitive knowledge (of qualities in thing and in senses).

2)   Plato :

A) mechanicism makes no sense when it tries to explain animated being and even substances, “when they speak of a real living mortal, they affirm some reality. Is it not, as they confess, an animated body?  Thus, they put the soul at the level of the beings?  Don’t they affirm the soul to be either just or unjust, sensitive or senseless?...”[14] 

B) 2 questions are raised by Plato :

a) are the qualities distinct from quantity or reduced to it (mechanicist problem)?

b) Does the spiritual exist, or is everything corporeal (materialist problem)? 

c) The 2 problems are necessarily tied since to reject any quality leads to reject the spirit.

 

3)   Ar. ‘qualitatem dico secundum quam aliqui dicuntur quales.’

 

4)   Descartes, following his criterion of the clear and distinct idea (as real being), wanted to do away with whatever was not mathematically evident. He was nevertheless obliged to preserve the accident quality for the spiritual world. But his corporeal nature excludes any quality and becomes mechanist, which means that geometry studies directly the  bodily substances, which are mere extension, the only possible change is movement (not intensity), and the only activity is the ‘shock’ (Vs. the scholastic faculties or potencies).[15]

5)   Hegel gives again quality its place as ‘the immediate determination’. Quality as opposed to quantity is used in the dialectical theory of ‘progress by jumps’ : comings and losses are obtained suddenly by the passage from the quantitative to the qualitative. This view will be adopted in the Marxist theory.

6)   Bergson reacts against the mechanicist theories and affirms that even extension is quality, distended quality. Quality, not quantity, is positive : quantity is only the inverse of the qualitative ‘élan’ (spring).  Teilhard de Chardin follows him somewhat, at least to say that mathematics and mechanics reach the ‘outside’, but should not deny the ‘inside’ which is consciousness.

 

ii. NATURE

 

1)   Definition : Qualitas est accidens determinativum seu modificativum substantiae in seipsa

A) determinativum subst. : Vs. quantitas (which does not determine but extends; which is the accident of the matter rather than of the form/substance).

B) in seipsa : vs. all other accidents which are somewhat extrinsic (relation, et alia)

2)   S.Q. : The study of quality is of major importance in dogmatic theology : grace, the virtues, the gifts, the sacramental characters are all qualities; and also in moral theology (and psychology) : habits good or bad, faculties...

 

iii. division

 

	in seipsa (suscipiens bonum et malum ex ordine ad naturam) et mobilis		- difficile :              - facile :	habitus dispositio
absolute consi-	in ordine ad	activitatem	- sufficiens :       - debilis :	potentia impotentia
derata		passivitatem	- transiens -diu permanens	- passio - qlts patibilis
relative ad	cum formositate			forma
quantitatem	sine formositate			figura

 

 

Quality is a univocal genus divided into species :

 

1)   Prima species :

A) Habitus : accidens difficile mobile, disponens subiectum ad bene vel male esse sive operari

a) operative habits : virtue or vice, science or int. deformation which determine the operative potencies;

b) entitative habits : health, grace.

B) dispositio (idem sed facile mobile), e.g. humour, indisposition, virtue not well rooted in subject.

2)   Secunda species :

A) potentia : accidens disponens subjectum ad operandum vel ad resistendum (faculties, or powers of operations, eg. pot. digestiva, motrix, intellectiva, resistentiae). They are the proximate principles of operations of the substance, and sometimes they need to be further determined by the operative habits to reach properly their object : the intellect needs the habit of logic to make proper syllogisms.

 

B) impotentia : lack or debility of the same faculty.

 

3)   Tertia species :

A) passio : accidens sensibilem alterationem causans  vel a sensibili alteratione causatum. It is a movement of the sensitive appetite (eg. suffering, fear) which is accompanied by a physical and sensible alteration.[16] We must not confuse it with the passio (which is the passio transitiva as in the term of the action, opposed to actio in the principle of action: to be hit vs. to hit). The sensitive passions are terms of immanent actions (I II 22-25; 31,5; 74,1; I 85,2).

B) qualitas patibilis : colour of hair; the temperament (melancholic, irascible...)

4)   4ª species belongs to quality, but refers to the quantitative aspect, found only in material beings

A) figura : accidens resultans ex terminatione quantitatis quoad se consideratae secundum diversam dispositionem partium eius.

B) forma : idem, cum debita proportione, in artificial things (I II 49,2-4).

 

 

iv. properties (I II 52-53)

 

1)   habet contrarium. Within the same genus, contrary qualities can be found, eg. health/sickness in body, s. grace in the soul, virtue and vice in the will.

2)   fundat relationem similitudinis (vs qtty : relt. equalitatis; vs subst. fundat rel. identitatis)

3)   suscipit magis et minus : true of all, important esp. for the habitus.

I II 49,1-3 : the habits are ordered to an immanent or transitive act (eg. scientia, ars sculptoris).

A) The habits (virtues) are necessary to man because : omnis res est propter se operans. Ie. man finds his perfection-finality, evntele,ceia-, in his intellectual (and moral) operation, which is proper to him. Virtue is said avreth. (virtus=force) to indicate the operative perfection of nature.

B) How are they obtained ?

a) The intellective habits are obtained by learning from a teacher, except the unique natural habit, nou,j (int. et synderesis),

b) the infused moral virtues are obtained together w. sanctifying grace,

c) the acquired moral virtues are obtained not by nature (it is not in the child yet) but by repetition of acts.[17] The merit consists more in the perfection of the virtue (or lo,goj) than in the effort made. The acts following the virtue will be done prompte, facile et delectabiliter (with the same merit).

C) increase: A science can augment, not only by the radication in the substance (inesse of the accident quality), but also and 2rly only by the object of science which can be extended to more conclusions. Quality (esp. virtues) does not augment by addition on the part of the substance, since addition says distinction and only one same kind of quality can exist at the same time in the subst.[18]

D) diminution : Can there be diminution of quality by corruption?

a) corruption per se : is obtained by the action of its contrary, eg. error corrupts science

b) corruption per accidens : when the subject disappears bec. accidentia sunt suppositorum.

c) diminution : could only be in the same mode as the increase ie. by subtraction (for quality there is neither addition nor subtraction properly speaking). C/f. theology explains that charity, eg., does not diminish properly by remiss acts or by venial sin, but is making man more apt to mortal sin.

 

 

 

 

 

I. history

 

1)      Ar. was so convinced that relation is not a being having a certain content, but meant only that a thing is relative to another, that he used it against Plato’s theory of Ideas : for Plato, the Ideas of equality and unequality are subsistent realities. But Ar. remarks that what is relative ta. pro,j tiv , cannot subsist (Mph V,15).

2)   S. Aug. introduces the concept of relation in theology about the H. Trinity (De Trinit V,5), but he notes that the ‘ad alium’ in God is not stg accidental.

3)   Boethius says that relation, which does not belong per se to a subject, is said of it from the outset when the term of comparison is present, adds nothing to being nor takes anything back : he seems to reduce it to an ens rationis.

4)   Ockham denied the reality of relations, whereas in modern times, Locke considered them as added to the simple ideas “something else separate and exterior to the existence of that thing” really denying its existence, as well as Hume later on. Such denial led Kant to consider relation as a subjective a priori category of the h. intellect.

5)   W. James on the contrary affirms that we have a real experience of the relations (feelings...) but he has another notion of relation.

 

 

ii. existence and notion

 

1)   Objection and Answer:

A) Objection : Entia non sunt multiplicanda[19]. We do not need to add relation as a being since we already have the foundation of the relation as a real accident. Eg. the active generation is real, not paternity.

B) Answer : the beings of the universe do not exist separately but in relation to one another. Harmony, equilibrium, respect, adaptation are not things, yet they certainly exist as relations between things. “Perfectio et bonum quae sunt in rebus extra animam, non solum attenditur sec. aliquid absolute inhaerens rebus, sed etiam sec. ordinem unius rei ad aliam; sicut etiam in ordine partium exercitus bonum exercitus consistit; huic enim ordini comparat Philosophus ordinem universi”.[20] 

C) Relations are maximi momenti since they establish the hierarchical order of beings (giving unity to the universe). Through them, the superiors perfect the inferiors, the inferiors are ordered to the superiors, the whole is ordered to God as first cause and ult. end. Sciences try to discover the order of the universe. Man as an individual will perfect himself in as much as he lives in accordance with this natural order.

2)   Relations real or of reason

some relations are only concepts of the mind (which itself places the connection ad aliud : eg. ‘the same is identical to itself’ needs the mind to divide what is one same thing; the relation between being and non-being; the logical relation between genus and species).

-        other relations exist before we think of them (based on actio/passio like paternity-filiation).[21]

-        others are non mutual relations (real in one sense, of reason in the other: between the knower and the thing known, only one is modified; cf. relation of creation).

3)   Thus ST. concludes :

A) that relation has a double aspect :

a) as an accident, it has the esse in subjecto.

b) as a relation or order, it has the esse ad aliud, ‘quasi in aliud transiens’.

B) That is why he considers it as the accident which has the last esse and most imperfect esse :

a) the last bec. it comes not only after the subst. but after other accidents out of which it is formed.

b) the most imperfect bec. its esse depends not only on the esse of the subst. but also of another exterior thing.[22]

4)   Definition :

A) Relatio est  accidens cuius totum esse est ad aliud se habere.

B) The predicamental relation needs 3 elements :

a) the subject in which the relation is found.

b) the term with which the subject is related.

c) the foundation, by which the two terms are related.

 

 

iii. division

 

		cum dependentia in esse	mensurantis - objectum                     - exemplar
Relatio	Realis		non mensurantis (p. actionem):4 causae
sec. esse		sine dependentia in esse	- sec. subst: identitas - sec. qltt : similitudo - sec. qtt : aequalitas
	Rationis
Relatio sec. dici (transcendentalis[23]) : ordo entis absoluti per se ordinati[24]

 

The relations are said of reason whenever one of the 3 elements of the real relation is missing, eg. :

- relation bet. concepts (species and genus) : bec. neither the extremes nor the foundation are real

- rel. of identity with myself : there are no 2 extremes.

- rel. with one of the extremes unreal : relation of the present with the future (time), of being with nothingness (space).

- rel. which corresponds to a non mutual relation (knowing, creating) has a real foundation only in one of the terms, not in the 2d (object known or God are not really changed by the relation). In this case, the foundation is not real bec. it does not affect the subject.

 

            4) properties of relation

 

1.    non habet contrarium 

2.    non suscipit magis et minus.

3.    dicitur ad convertentiam (mutual implication)

4.    est simul natura

5.    est simul cognitione.

 

 

 

 

 

 

I. the principle of individuation

 

            1) the fact of individuation of substances

 

1)   There exists things of equal species (essence) having the same degree of being, yet numerically distinct (singular from each other and multiple as a whole).

2)   The principle of the specific identity is the form (which gives ‘vertical’ diversity).[25]

3)   The principle of the numerical distinction is matter which, as a receptive potency[26], multiplies and singularises the form (which gives ‘horizontal’ diversity).

 

            2) the principle of individuation

 

1)   Multiplication of the essences :

A) The plurality of individuals of the same species supposes necessarily a distinction of form and matter, and ultimately a composition of pot/act. On the other hand, a pure form is necessarily one and individual.

B) the first principle of the numerical multiplication of the species is matter as receptor of form.

C) Objection/Reply  :

Obj Mat. I is pure indetermination.How can something indeterminate determine/distinguish? 

Reply : the substantial form must somewhat intervene.

2)   Singularisation  of the essences [27]:

A) The fact of singularity : individuals participate in different degree in the perfections of the specific form (men are intelligent in different degrees); the common form participated becomes this or that, it becomes a singular distinct being.

B) the principle of individuation : Materia signata quantitate.

a) Materia I per se cannot singularize the individuals, unless it is affected by the accident quantity, which distinguishes part from part. The distinct bits and pieces of quantified matter individuate the subst. form by contracting it to this matter and not to that one.

b) But such an accident can come only to the complete substance : made of I Mat. + Forma S.

c) hence, there are 3 moments :

i the form actuates I Matter and allows the coming of quantity;[28]

ii quantity gives dimensions to matter and renders it individual, with its concrete dimensions,[29] making it this matter distinct from all others;

iii individuated matter can individuate the substantial form.

3)   Individuation of accidents (III 77,2): Accidents are also individual and singular (my science is not yours!). How does it happen?

A) Accidents are not individuated by Mat.I, but by their proper subject (quasi materia) : the subst.

B) The accident of quantity has a particularity that it serves as support of all material accidents, it being subjected in the substance. Thus the material accidents are affected by quantity (III 77,2).

C) Theological application : the eucharistic accidents remain singular despite the disappearance of the substance, because they are subjected in quantity.

ii. the subsisting subject.

 

            1) s.q.

 

1)   Objection/Reply :

A) Objection : the nature (i.e. individuated essence, e.g. this humanity) seems to be identical to the substance (Peter), since :

Petrus = homo (essentia univ.) + principium individt = essentia individuata.

B) Reply :

a) the individuated nature of Christ is not a person.

b) subst/essence = whole/formal part = quod est/quo substantia est. Subst. gives ontological sufficiency & autonomy.

2)   The question raised historically by the theological debate is in itself philosophical. What is the nature of the new element called subsistence which adds something to the nature and turns it into a substance?

3)   Properties of the subsisting subject :

A) individual : only the singular beings exist, since the esse cannot come to a universal nature, ens et unum convertuntur.

B) subsistent, it is that which exists, exercises the act of being.

C) incommunicable, i.e. it cannot be communicated to another being (Subst. form can be communicated to another matter).

 

            2) diverse opinions

 

1)   Scotus :

A) position : subsistence is stg negative, since it denies the communication of this nature to another substance (haecceitas = subsistence = singularity).

B) Objection to Scotus: that which gives the perfection of  personalitas cannot be purely negative.

2)   Suarez :

A) position : since esse = essentia, subsistence perfects (and comes after) both the essence and the esse. Thus subsistence is a mode of perfection which comes to the already existing being.

B) Objection to Suarez : Esse is the ultimate act, really distinct from the essence : the substance cannot receive any further essential perfection after receiving the esse.

3)   Capreolus :

A) position : esse = subsistentia.

B) Objection : esse is a principle ‘quo’, and prerequires the subject established as ‘quod’.

4)   Cajetan, John of ST, alii : Subsistentia = modus substantialis positivus terminans naturam in linea essentiae.

 

            3) s. thomas[30]

 

1)   the concept of Person :

A) Definition of person [31]:

a) from Boethius : Naturae rationalis individua substantia.

b) from ST : Subsistens in rationali natura[32].

B) Individuality : ‘individuum autem est quod est in se indistinctum ab aliis vero distinctum’, which could be said of accidents, but more properly of the substance. 

C) Unity : ‘ens indivisum’. The independence in the operation comes from the unity in its being.

D) totality : “in the supposit, there is included the nature of the species, and certain other things which are outside the notion of species (accidents and individuating principles). Thus, the supposit signifies the whole thing, which regards its nature as the formal and perfective part”.[33]

Subsistence : I 29,2 :

 

Substantia	quidditas rei: what the definition means (or essence)
can mean		subsistence : existing per se not in another
2 things :	subject or supposit (what subsists	res naturae : included in a common nature
	in the genus of subst.) called :	hypostasis or substantia: subject of accidts

 

 

“What these 3 words (subsistentia, res naturae, substantia) signify commonly in the entire genus of substance, the word ‘person’ signifies it in the genus of rational substances”.

a) The person ‘quod est perfectissimum in tota natura’, receives :

i from its nature, its spiritual mode of being,

ii from its subsistence, the full possession of self and incommunicability, sufficiency.

iii from the ‘esse’, the actuality of all perfection.

iv ccls : the dignity of the person, the peculiarity and perfection of its operation, is rooted in the riches of its act of esse (it has an ontological foundation, and not only a psychological one as Descartes thought).

b) The caracteristics of ‘image of God’ are manifested in man’s :

i liberty : “masters of their own acts, not only in so far as they are moved as other beings, but they work by themselves”[34] (directing themselves to their end, cum cognitione finis).

ii responsibility : free acts found the merit of a reward or of a chastisement.

iii love of friendship : only a person can be loved for its own sake and not as means.

iv order to God : the entire free human acting should be directed to the ultimate end, which gives unity to h. life.

2)   distinction between supposit and nature.

A) Cf. I 3,3 and 4 “Utrum sit idem Deus quod sua essentia vel natura; “utrum sit in Deo idem essentia et esse”; Quodl II 2,1-2 “Utrum angelus substantialiter sit compositus ex essentia et esse”, “Utr. in angelo sit aliud suppositum et natura”.

B) For ST, the distinction of supposit and nature exists only where there is real distinction of esse and essentia (cf. chapter V) : “in the signification of ‘nature’ is contained only that which belongs to the notion of the species; but the supposit has also all the other things which are added to it ‘quae ei accidunt’; and thus, the supposit indicates the whole, whereas the nature indicates the quiddity or formal part.”[35] Thus he concludes as a general law that “cuicumque potest aliquid accidere[36] quod non sit de ratione suae naturae, in eo differt res et quod quid est, sive suppositum et natura.”

C) The distinction between nature and supposit is founded on the distinction per se and per accidens, and not on the distinction of matter and form (which both include) nor of universal and particular (both are singular).

3)   Relation between supposit and nature :

A) ST junior used, ST senior did not, the distinction of essence and ex. to prove the distinction of supposit and nature since the supposit includes existence whereas nature does not necessarily.[37]

B) This ‘esse’ is one of these ‘praeter essentiam’ which perfect the supposit :“Et ideo, licet ipsum esse non sit de ratione suppositi[38], quia tamen pertinet ad suppositum, et non est de ratione naturae, manifestum est quod suppositum et natura non sunt omnino idem in quibuscumque res non est suum esse”.

C) in the person, the esse ‘ut actus’[39] is the final and most universal thing which God gives to the creature, and the term and most perfect actuation of the essential principles.  This may allow us to deepen the mystery of Christ and say that his human nature does not ‘terminate’ in an ‘esse ut actus’ proper, but that it is terminated by the esse of the Word.

D) both esse (ut actus, in actu) can be said in abstracto of the person :‘the person is’, but only the esse in actu can be said in concreto, ‘this person is’. This observation of logic sheds much light on the obscure dispute about the ‘formal constitutive of the supposit’[40].

 

            4) conclusion[41]

 

1)   S.Q. Positions re. subsistence.

A) The Scotists : it is stg negative, a) the virtual (aptitudinalis) negation of the natural dependence on another subject to exist, b) the actual negation of dependence on the div. supposit by obediential pot.

B) Capreolus, Complutenses, Billot, etc. It is stg positive added to the nature itself, the esse ut actus, the substantial existence of the essence.

C) Cajetan, John of ST, Salmanticenses, Bañez, say it is stg positive, but only in the line of the nature, and not of existence.

2)   The position of Capreolus is in line with the thomistic principles :

A) to subsist = to be. As the being of the accidents is ‘to be in’ (inesse), the being of the substance is to subsist : hence to subsist is not really distinct from the substantial esse or actus essendi of the substance itself. Indeed the esse and essentia (individuated) constitute the ‘ens simpliciter’ and there would be a rupture in thomistic metaphysics if there was an intermediary betw. esse and essentia.

B) Christ is lacking nothing human. In this opinion, Christ is lacking absolutely nothing in his human nature in the line of the essence, and thus it can be integrally assumed by the Person of the Word in which it subsists by the divine esse. The other opinion of Cajetan followed by many thomists to this day states that subsistence is an extra determinator of the essence to line it up with existence. In this opinion, something would be missing to the humanity of Christ in the line of the essence; which is false. If the Cajetanists argue that this terminal mode indicates neither a perfection nor an imperfection, then they play with words, because in metaphysics, there is no ‘indifferent’ determination.

C) Person is different from the nature. In this opinion, we understand clearly why the supposit is the total principle (quod) of the being and of the acting and why the nature is the formal principle (quo).

Wisely the Angelic doctor said : “The esse and the operari come to the person from the nature, but in a different way in each case. For the esse belongs to the very constitution of the person, and thus under this aspect it has the ‘ratio termini’. And that is why the unity of the person requires the unity of the esse complete and personal. On the other hand, the operation is an effect of the person according to a certain form or nature”.[42]

D) Objection resolved.

a) Are there two esse in Christ? The ‘Quaestio de Unione Verbi Incarnati’ seems to say that yes, there is a double esse, a principal one (divine) and another secundary (of the h. nat.) (art.4).

b) However this difficulty is only apparent. ST denies that “Christ be simply (absolutely speaking) double according to the esse” (ad 1); thus the ‘esse’ according to the human nature does not belong to the supposit and does not have the value of ‘actus essendi’ except in a logical or existential sense.